"We can always supply overwhelming military power, the question is what is the right answer for the end state we seek ... six months from now and a year from now," said Colonel John C. Coleman, chief of staff for the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force (1st MEF).

Marines rolled into Fallujah three weeks ago with the intent of wiping out a dogged insurgency which has been the thorn in the side of the occupying forces since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime a year ago.

Over 2,000 marines fought furiously in the town's industrial wasteland, mosques and crowded residential blocks in the worst fighting Iraq had seen under US-led occupation.

The field commanders spoke of "cleaning out the city," but the images of Fallujah on fire and reports of hundreds dead and thousands wounded risked blowing up in the face of the coalition and the offensive ground to a halt.

Coalition military officers recognised there was no instant military solution for Fallujah, that simply wiping the insurgents out in urban war would not pacify the Sunni Muslim bastion.

If they wanted to win in Fallujah, US military planners realised they had to convince most of the Iraqi fighters to lay down their arms and share in the country's post-war reconstruction.

The Americans are now trying to woo Sunni Muslim veterans of Saddam's military, who were initially sidelined from the rebuilding effort under a policy of 'debaathification' -- a purge of Saddam's Baath Party loyalists.

They could then be recruited to the Iraqi Civil Defence Corps and police to help battle the insurgents here, characterised by the US-led coalition as hardcore criminals, jihadists and former Iraqi security agents.

"He might want to shoot at us today. (But) he may want to be our friend tomorrow," Coleman told AFP.

"If we conduct a full-scale assault in the city, we risk losing him."

US Army Colonel Buck Connor, in charge of Fallujah's sister city of Ramadi, gives credence to the theory that many of the fighters here are not die-hard insurgents, but poverty-stricken Sunnis alienated in the post-Saddam era.

"I can influence them by providing them with a job and a future," Connor said.

The colonel was betting reconstruction dollars, estimated at 540 million dollars for Anbar province, would prove the decisive factor.

"We'll defeat the insurgency with civil-military operations and when there is a legitimate Iraqi government in place," he said.

Until then, Connor contends there will still be days when the guerrillas carry out deadly attacks no matter how hard US forces try to contain them.

"The insurgency waxes and wanes. You have to stay focused on the long-term goals," he said.

The US military has already drafted a plan for the first 60 days of peace in Fallujah that promises 3.2 million dollars in relief, followed by another 74 million dollars for huge road, school, hospital and water treatment projects.

"Most Iraqis say if you deal with the unemployment, you may have a chance to deal with the security problem," said Colonel Jesse Barker, the head of civil affairs for the 1st MEF.

"In my dealings with Iraqis, I think most of them are fence sitters, waiting to see what happens."

If heavy fighting does flare again, Barker warns the Americans will have to deliver on their promises to build a prosperous Fallujah once the dust settles, or they will jeopardise their chances for long-term victory.

"Once we get rid of them (insurgents), we have to do the things we say we're going to do and do them well," he said.

"Then Fallujans may say 'We don't like the Americans, but we do like what they are doing'. If we can get to that point, we'll be fine."

WAR.WIRE