"The Official History of the Falklands Campaign" by top historian Lawrence Freedman offers an unprecedented account of the build up to the 10-week conflict and the ensuing battles, including the controversial sinking of Argentina's Belgrano cruiser.

Commissioned by the British government as part of a history series, the 1,102-page book draws on public evidence and secret documents to describe the crisis -- in which 649 Argentine and 255 British troops died -- and how then prime minister Margaret Thatcher acted.

"My basic objective was to provide an account of what happened that people would trust and not think that I had any sort of political agenda of my own," said Freedman, a professor of war studies at King's College London.

"I found that was the safest approach to take," he told AFP in an interview.

Freedman said the most interesting fact he discovered during some eight years spent researching and writing the book -- which is published in three tomes -- was that Britain had transported nuclear arms to the South Atlantic.

The military never intended to use the weapons against Argentina, but had decided that there had been insufficient time to off-load them, he said.

Britain's Ministry of Defence admitted in December 2003 that some naval vessels were sent to fight the Falklands War carrying nuclear weapons, but Freedman said his book offered the most detailed account yet of the event.

He describes how two ships -- Brilliant and Broadsword -- were called up to join a fleet of war vessels, each carrying two MC (600) nuclear depth charges.

The book recounts the anguish of Britain's war cabinet, headed by Thatcher, over whether to send ships routinely equipped with nuclear arms into battle or delay their departure by up to 36 hours to unload them.

In the end, ministers decided to store the weapons on two carriers -- Hermes and Invincible -- which would not be allowed to enter the Falklands' territorial waters to avoid potentially violating any international law.

"This meant that Hermes was carrying 40 percent and Invincible 25 percent of the total UK stockpile of MC (600)s into the South Atlantic," Freedman wrote.

Fears about the potential consequences of a direct hit, following a string of deadly Argentine air attacks on the British fleet, prompted the decision-makers to order the nuclear arms out of the area on May 28.

The book noted, however, that this did not happen completely until June 26 -- almost two weeks after the fighting ended.

While rubbishing any speculation that Britain had planned to use nuclear force in the April-June war, Freedman explored the possibility that such weapons were brought along for a more tactical purpose.

He wrote that Britain's chief of defence staff Admiral Sir Terence "Lewin had not asked for nuclear depth charges, and had no plans to use them, but he was inclined to take them to the South Atlantic, just in case.

"The scenario he had in mind involved Russian submarines getting involved on the Argentine side."

Argentina took Britain by surprise when it stormed the tiny islands off its southern coast on April 2, 1982, following years of failed negotiations over the Falklands' sovereignty. London has occupied the territory since 1833 but Buenos Aires claims the land as its own.

Freedman's book documents both sides' claims of ownership pre-1833. Argentina believes it inherited the so-called Malvinas from Spain in 1816, while Britain argues it already owned the islands after discovering and occupying them from the 1770s.

In January 1833, Britain reasserted its authority over the Falklands, taking control from an Argentine military commander in a peaceful confrontation. But doubts remain over whether London acted legally.

Freedman describes a memorandum drawn up by an assistant librarian at the Foreign Office, Gaston de Bernhardt, in 1910, which boosted Argentina's claim.

The historian quoted one unnamed recipient of the note as saying: "From a perusal of this memo it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Argentine government's attitude is not altogether unjustified, and that our action has been somewhat high-handed."

At the same time, Freedman said Britain increased its claim over the Falklands by effectively occupying the area for the past 172 years, but this theory has never been tested by international law.

In the interview, he said the irony of the whole affair was that London would probably have concluded the islands were uneconomically viable had Argentina not muscled in with brute force.

Following the war and a change in fishing licences, the Falklands' economy picked up, making the islanders less inclined to turn to Argentina, he said.

"Because the Argentines rushed in when they did, they transformed the whole future of the colony and that is how it remains."

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