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China's Military Hardware Doctrine For The Early 21st Century Part Two
Washington (UPI) Feb 7, 2008 China is certainly in no state yet to produce its own long-range strategic bombers, air-refueling tankers or air transport aircraft like the C-130 Hercules or the C-17 Globemaster and must therefore continue to try and buy them off the shelf, if not from the United States because of deteriorating relations, then from Russia. The main reason for the reluctance of China to invest in aircraft carriers up to now -- unlike India, which is already far advanced in building, buying and deploying a fleet of three of them -- is its inability to buy "off the shelf" from the West aircraft carriers that actually work. Russia and France have both built and deployed aircraft carriers that proved to be international jokes. Russian analysts have openly admitted in their own media that on one of its most recent exercises, the Admiral Kuznetsov started sinking as soon as it left St. Petersburg for the Baltic Sea and had to rapidly return to harbor. Only the United States and Britain enjoy a reliable and confident mastery of aircraft carrier operating procedures, though India is moving fast in that direction. China's reluctance so far to build a multicarrier fleet is therefore well-founded in a realization of the engineering and operational difficulties involved. But that does not mean China has rejected the strategy of extending its military as well as economic and diplomatic power far beyond its immediate neighborhood. On the contrary, China has long been moving steadily and purposefully in building a pattern of major naval bases in friendly nations across the Indian Ocean that could project its power around India and all the way to the eastern coast of Africa. These bases already exist, or are being developed, in the Andaman Islands, Myanmar, Pakistan and Mauritius and they are known as the "string of pearls" strategy. They mean diesel submarines would not be limited to purely defensive roles in China's home waters but could operate for significant periods of time many thousands of miles away from home. Similarly, under favorable conditions, China could exert its already formidable air power using hundreds of Sukhoi interceptors or fighter-bombers that at least in numbers if not in electronics or firepower might prove a challenge to U.S. carrier-based air groups operating in the region. China has therefore already developed a relatively ambitious strategy to project its power effectively thousands of miles across the oceans to protect the sea routes of its key oil imports from the nations of the Middle East. And this strategy takes into account the weapons that China can already produce effectively itself, those it has been able to buy freely "off the shelf," primarily from Russia, and the weapons systems such as aircraft carriers that it has so far been unable or unwilling to either build itself or buy from other countries. A key weapon in developing such a strategy that China already employs is the anti-ship Sunburnt, or SS-N-22 Moskit, missile that it has bought from Russia -- along with four Sovremenny-class destroyers to carry them. Sovremennys and Sunburns are not just chicken liver: As we have noted in previous UPI analyses, the Moskit is explicitly designed to kill American nuclear-powered super-aircraft carriers. The deterrent effect of having four Sovremenny warships equipped with them would be to force U.S. carrier groups to operate from farther out in the Western Pacific Ocean in the event of any conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan. However, selling Sovremennys and Moskits to China certainly did not affect the strategic balance of forces between Russia and China. The two nations are primarily military land powers. Sovremennys and Sunburns are a natural complement to the "string of pearls" strategy of using Indian Ocean bases for short-range force projection instead of nuclear aircraft carriers and subs that are almost permanently at sea. But once again, they had to be bought from Russia.
Next: China's land weapons weakness Community Email This Article Comment On This Article Related Links Learn about the Superpowers of the 21st Century at SpaceWar.com Learn about nuclear weapons doctrine and defense at SpaceWar.com
Military Matters: Rebuilding states
Washington (UPI) Jan 28, 2008 For centuries, continental wars that included Britain tended to follow a pattern. The British would send an army to the continent; it would be defeated by the French or Germans; the British would withdraw to their island; and their triumphant European enemy would draw up a superior force on the French or Dutch Channel coast. There was little doubt about the outcome, should that army land in Britain. But it could never get across the English Channel. |
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