"In its simplest terms, my strategy is to determine the regimes intentions for all the activities ISG has uncovered," Charles Duelfer, leader of the Iraq Survey Group, told the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The new strategy represents a change in direction from the past effort to uncover hidden caches of chemical and biological weapons as well as secret programs to produce them, the main rationale for the US invasion of Iraq.

Duelfer's predecessor, David Kay, resigned last month and said he had come to the conclusion that Iraq had no stockpiles of banned weapons when the United States invaded the country a year ago.

Duelfer, who testified behind closed doors, said in a prepared statement the search by the 1,200-member ISG had been hampered by the "extreme reluctance" of Iraqi scientists and managers to speak freely and the difficulty of sorting through millions of documents.

"We do not know whether Saddam was concealing WMD in the final years or planning to resume production once sanctions were lifted," he said.

"We do not know what he ordered his senior ministers to undertake. We do not know how the disparate activities we have identified link together."

"In short, obtaining clear, truthful information from the senior Iraqi leadership has been problematic even at this point in time," he said.

Among the ISG's findings so far, Duelfer said:

-- The Tuwaitha Agricultural and Biological Research Center had equipment suitable for the production of biological agents, and was conducting research on a biopesticide that could be used as a surrogate for anthrax, and single cell proteins that had previously been used as a cover for biological agent production.

-- Iraq was working to build new chemical facilities at the time of the war, and had plans to be able to produce a year's supply of any one of a variety of chemicals in 30 days.

"This was a crash program," Duelfer said. Only a few of the chemicals were considered dual use, including one that had been used before to stabilize VX nerve gas.

-- Iraqi scientists were developing a rail gun, ostensibly as an air defense weapons. But the rail gun experiments had applications for nuclear weapons research. Documents at the lab described diagnostic techniques important for nuclear weapons techniques.

Others documents described a high voltage switch that can be used to detonate a nuclear weapon laser detonation, nuclear fusion, radiation measurement, and radiation safety.

"It is this combination of topics that makes us suspect this lab was intentionally focused on research applicable for nuclear weapons development," he said.

-- Iraq had a "robust" missile and unmanned aircraft (UAV) program. It was developing a variety of UAVs using Global Positioning System and inertial navigation systems. It flight tested missiles and UAVs with ranges exceeding a 150 kilometer (93 mile) UN limit, and was discussing with North Korea on technology for a missile in the 1,300 kilometer (800 mile) range.

"Foreign missile experts" worked in Iraq in violation of UN sanctions from 1998 until just before the invasion, he said, "They undertook a complete review of the al-Samoud surface-to-surface missile system, which exceeded UN range limits."

"We must determine what Saddam ordered, what his ministers ordered, and how the plans fit together," Duelfer said.

"Were weapons hidden that were not readily available? Was there a plan for a break out production capacity? Were WMD technologies being developed for the missile and UAV programs? When did the leadership want to see results? How would technologies be integrated?" he asked.

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