Charles Duelfer's key judgements in report of more than 1,000 pages make only glancing reference to the absence of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs at the time of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Instead, he focused on Iraq's "strategic intent," arguing that the Iraqi leader, who was ousted by the invasion, intended to revive his weapons of mass destruction programs if he could get sanctions lifted.

"Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq's WMD capability -- which was essentially destroyed in 1991 -- after sanctions were removed and Iraq's economy stabilized, but probably with a different mix of capabilities to that which previously existed," the report said.

"Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear capability -- in an incremental fashion, irrespective of international pressure and the resulting economic risks -- but he intended to focus on ballistic missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW) capabilities," it said.

However, the report also said that the Iraqi regime "had no formal written strategy or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions."

There was no identifiable group of policy makers on weapons of mass destruction separate from Saddam.

"Instead, his lieutenants understood WMD revival was his goal from their long association with Saddam and his infrequent, but firm, verbal comments and directions to them," it said.

The preeminent motivation for seeking weapons of mass destruction was Iran, the report said.

"All senior level Iraqi officials considered Iran to be Iraq's principal enemy in the region. The wish to balance Israel and acquire status and influence in the Arab world were also considerable, but secondary," it said.