The Stalinist state's move opened the way for bumpy negotiations that could stretch months, even years into the future, according to experts. The potential for war, never ruled out in Washington or Pyongyang, has receded for now.

Pyongyang cloaked its decision to agree to six-way talks with a face-saving statement that Washington had accepted bilateral talks at the same time.

More likely, analysts suggest, was a realization by Kim Jong-Il, who presides over a failed economy and has worn out his welcome with his chief champion China, that six-way talks were the best option he was going to get.

"Perhaps he figured out that post-September 11, the Americans are less likely to blink first," said Yu Suk-Ryul, North Korean expert at the Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security here.

The nuclear crisis erupted in October when Washington accused the Stalinist state of reneging on a 1994 bilateral nuclear freeze accord by running a clandestine atomic programme based on enriched uranium,

A first breakthrough came six months later when North Korea agreed to take part in three-way talks in Beijing with the United States and hosts China.

For the North Koreans, the meeting was a fig leaf for the bilateral talks they maintained were the only way to resolve the crisis they insisted was between Pyongyang and Washington.

That was a major sticking point for Washington, which accused North Korea of violating almost immediately the 1994 Agreed Framework negotiated in Geneva.

Senior US officials from President George W. Bush on down had emphatically ruled out a bilateral solution, saying neighbouring countries affected by North Korean nuclear ambitions must have a place at the table.

But North Korea feels that Washington, which frustrated its plans to unite the Korean peninsula under communism during the 1950-53 Korean War and has been an implacable foe ever since, is the one country that threatens its existence and the only one it needs to negotiate with.

Under the 1994 accord, North Korea mothballed its plutonium producing plant at Yongbyon so as to receive two advanced light-water reactors -- considered proliferation-free and worth nearly five billion dollars -- as well as a supply of fuel oil from the United States to meet energy needs until the reactors came on stream.

Following the October revelations, the 1994 deal swiftly unravelled and Washington stopped the fuel deliveries. North Korea then upped the stakes, kicking out International Atomic Energy monitors and withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation treaty.

Months of stalemate followed, with Washington vowing never to bow to nuclear blackmail and demanding the immediate and verifiable dismantling of North Korea nuclear drive. Pyongyang, meanwhile, sought a non-aggression pact before it would address Washington's security concerns -- and only then through one-on-one talks.

A period of dangerous brinkmanship followed, in which North Korea said it had reprocessed 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods sealed in cooling tanks under the 1994 accord.

Reprocessing would provide enough plutonium for up to six nuclear weapons in a matter of months. Washington and Seoul said they were unable to verify the claims, but South Korea's intelligence chief said in July that evidence indicated some reprocessing had begun.

Washington believes North Korea had already diverted enough plutonium prior to the 1994 nuclear freeze for up to two nuclear bombs.

During the early stages of the crisis, North Korea publicly protested it was innocent of all charges stemming from its possession of, or desire for, nuclear weapons.

Then in June, through its official Korean Central News Agency, Pyongyang openly boasted of its nuclear deterrent capability.

If true, the statement signalled a shift in the balance of power in Northeast Asia among China, the regional superpower and its only nuclear state; Japan, within range of North Korea's ballistic missiles; and an increasingly wary South Korea, still seeking reconciliation with its bellicose neighbour.

"Pyongyang couldn't pretend it was all about Washington any more," said Yu.

US demands for multilateral talks, which earned little support in the region early on, suddenly made sense, he added.

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