More than a decade ago, INR was incorrect in its assessment of Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological programs. The other intelligence agencies shared the view, but INR was "the most wrong," an intelligence expert said.

Further back in its history, INR consistently offered negative assessments of how the war in Vietnam was going, contradicting Pentagon findings as early as 1963, according to the National Security Archive, citing 1968 INR papers released under the Freedom of Information Act in 2003.

Time Magazine reported on the existence of the study in 1971: "In almost every case, the [INR] intelligence reports called the shots perfectly about such matters as the ineffectiveness of the bombing campaign, Vietnamese political upheavals and North Vietnamese troop buildups."

Because of its cautious and often spoiler stance on Iraq -- both correctly and incorrectly -- and other conflicts, INR is considered by some to be a dovish analysis branch within the intelligence community.

That reputation was further cemented when an INR analyst famously clashed with Undersecretary of State John Bolton in 2002 about the text of a statement he was planning to make on Cuba's biological weapons program and intentions.

But the notion of an INR political bias is not just the belief of the latest crop of so-called neo-conservatives: The mainstream conservative Heritage Foundation published a paper in 1988 denigrating INR's capabilities and noting its "conspicuous ... continued willingness to give the Soviet Union the benefit of the doubt" on arms control matters.

"INR sometimes is at odds with other bureaus and offices within the State Department, when they attempt to influence the interpretation of intelligence in ways favorable to their particular policy outlooks. By the same token, INR can be vulnerable to pressure from high levels within State as to the policy preferences of the Department as an institution. INR thus has tended to mirror the basic institutional and ideological outlook of the State Department on sensitive foreign policy and national security issues," the paper stated.

INR is an office with a roughly $50 million budget and about 165 analysts who average 15 years experience in their given areas, most with field time in their areas of expertise and with a network of personal contacts that inform their work.

Because of the office's small size, it does little original research but rather reviews the analysis and intelligence collected by other agencies and comes up with independent assessments, according to sources familiar with the office.

INR, which originated as the research branch for the World War II-era Office of Special Services, has remained resolutely small, and some intelligence experts consider the size of the office to be one of its assets. The relatively small office trains its own analysts and maintains an atmosphere of intellectual independence that could be diluted by the rapid infusion of green recruits, its defenders claim.

In its authorization report on the roughly $44 billion in intelligence spending for 2007, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence expressed concern that the Bureau of Intelligence and Research staff is too entrenched to adjust to the new emphasis on Iran.

"Such a major realignment of strategic priorities and of diplomats working on the 'front lines' may require a significant shift in intelligence support provided to department policymakers by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research," the report states

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